Indonesian Intent

Indonesian President Elect Joko Widodo, who is expected to be inaugurated on 20 October, is in position to oversee an era of unprecedented expansion in the capabilities of the country's armed forces (the Tentara Nasional Indonesia - TNI).

Underpinned by Indonesia's expanding defence budget, the TNI is projected to procure increasingly modern military assets over the coming decade to support the country's continuing emergence as a major power in the Asia-Pacific region.

The TNI has already made some significant strides towards modernisation under the two-term, 10-year leadership of outgoing president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. It ordered and upgraded a number of major military platforms, underwent organisational restructuring, and made progress in its efforts to improve professionalism. However, there is a long way to go. Imbalances continue to impinge on the capability of the TNI and its effectiveness as a modern fighting force. Conditions are exacerbated by escalating regional tensions and the absence of clear structure to the TNI's military modernisation programme: the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) initiative.

Defence policy

A key indicator of Widodo's intent will be the contents of a new defence White Paper, which is expected to be issued by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in 2015 and will replace the existing 2008 White Paper. This 2008 policy has been described as outlining a dated defensive posture, with its emphasis on a 'total people's war' doctrine. This is intended to reflect the country's historically limited capability - in terms of finances and military assets - to address effectively any external threat and a requirement therefore to develop what can be regarded as primarily a land-focused security system, based on the notion that the civilian population and infrastructure are critical components of national defence.

The posture can be linked to the mainly land-centric emphasis of the MEF programme and a stated requirement to establish the nature of military capabilities that Indonesia should, at a minimum, be able to deploy in response to threats such as internal conflict, natural disasters, and terrorism and insurgency.

Strategic drivers

The primary tasks of the new White Paper will be to determine the threats facing the country and Indonesia's response to such pressures. During this process it seems likely the government will need to reassess Indonesia's existing internal focus given the country's increasingly important strategic standing in the Asia-Pacific region and the rise of China.

Indonesia - by far the biggest country in Southeast Asia in terms of GDP, population and area - has the potential to play a greater role in Asia-Pacific security as the region's power base shifts. It should also be noted that over the coming decade Indonesia's external interests (particularly sea lines of communication and energy) are likely to become more difficult to harness and secure as China, and also India and the United States, all stake their claims for regional power.

In terms of internal threats Indonesia's major concerns include terrorism, insurgency, and natural disasters. The latter have become a great challenge for the country, most vividly demonstrated by the Acer tsunami in December 2004, although the country endures similar (but less devastating) disasters on a regular basis.

The threat from terrorism and insurgency remains, although the government has been successful in recent years in diminishing the influence of separatists in the western province of Aceh and the regional Islamist militant groups that were blamed for the 2009 Jakarta bombings. Separatist tensions still exist in the eastern province of Papua, however, and there is growing concern about Indonesian nationals joining jihadist groups in Syria who may return to the country as trained and motivated radicals.

Externally, pressure points are emerging that look likely to shape Indonesia's defence policy over the period expected to be addressed in the White Paper. Indonesia's wariness about its neighbours' intentions and military modernisation efforts continues to a degree, but the major concern - particularly behind closed doors - is China's expansionism.

Minimum Essential Force

Given Indonesia's shifting strategic threats it can be argued that its existing defence policy - and by extension the MEF programme - no longer accurately reflects the country's challenges. Widodo has already indicated a need to reassess the MEF programme's existing trajectory by outlining in pre-election pledges a requirement to support what he termed the "empowerment of an integrated system of armed forces".

The MEF plan is not detailed in official documents, but the current initial phase is understood to be focused on addressing broad internal threats until the development of a more capable TNI by the mid-2020s. This is also linked to a continuation of a reform process that aims to promote the development of the TNI as a modern, capable fighting force that, unlike in the past, is not involved in politics.

The mid-term stage is loosely defined as enhancing the TNI's capability to secure wider areas of the country's exclusive economic zone, while the final stages - up until the middle of the century - will have additional emphasis on enabling the TNI to address any perceived threat.

TNI modernisation
TNI modernisation for the foreseeable future is expected to be focused on the navy and air force, where many ageing platforms are still operated and rapid advances in capability will be most required if Indonesia is serious about responding to its challenges. The biggest obstacle facing all forces, however, is the sheer expanse of territory, which extends 5,120 km east to west and 1,760 km north to south, and underscores the importance of C4ISR-related capability developments that will facilitate a joined-up and effective TNI.

TNI-AL

The TNI-AL has invested in recent years in a range of capabilities - including Damen Sigma 10514-class frigates, BAE Systems Bung Tomo-class corvettes, and DSME Chang Bogo-class submarines - but shortcomings are significant if the service is to provide adequate territorial security. Reflecting this, TNI-AL officials have previously outlined a requirement for about 700 surface ships, although the existing inventory is thought to have a strength of only about 150.

Submarines are also a priority. The TNI-AL operates two German-designed Cakra-class Type 209/1300 boats built in the 1970s and the first of the service's three DSME submarines will enter service from about 2017: around the same time as the first of two Sigma frigates being licence-built locally.

TNI-AU

The TNI-AU regards its main responsibility as deterring invasion principally from the north, although it has increasingly played a role supporting disaster relief. Indonesia's traditional defensive posture means that the power-projection capability of the TNI-AU is extremely limited. Air combat capabilities are centred on a mix of largely incompatible platforms, including Lockheed Martin F-16A/Bs, Northrop F-5E Tiger IIs, Sukhoi Su-27s and Su-30s, as well as BAE Systems Hawk Mk 209 light attack aircraft. Trainer/combat requirements will also be met by 16 Korea Aerospace Industry T-50 Golden Eagle aircraft ordered in 2011, deliveries of which were completed in February 2014. A total of 24 refurbished F-16C/Ds ordered from the US in 2012 will boost capability further, as will planned replacements for the F-5Es.

About 30 transport aircraft are operational, although many of these have been in service for three decades or more. They include Lockheed Martin C-130B/Hs, Airtech CN235s and Dirgantara NC212s and a small number of Fokker F27s, which are being replaced by nine Military Airbus C295s ordered in 2012.

TNI-AD

Over the past 15 years the TNI-AD's focus has shifted from domestic security to internal strategic challenges and 'operations other than war' such as disaster relief and border security. The Indonesian National Police assumed responsibility for internal security when it separated from the TNI-AD in 1999, although the army retains a significant supporting role. Its operations and deployments tend to require intelligence, adequate mobility and dependable communications rather than advanced weapon systems. As such, major TNI-AD procurement has been limited and is likely to remain so.

Despite this, the TNI-AD secured in late 2012 an order for more than 100 Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks and 42 Marder 1A3 infantry fighting vehicles from Germany's Rheinmetall. The army will also benefit from a joint Indonesian-Turkish programme announced in 2014 to develop a medium tank. Other priorities have been to enhance combat and logistics capabilities through purchases of artillery systems and armoured personnel carriers. Thales' Forceshield air-defence system was ordered in early 2014.

Indonesia's challenging geography also means there are significant requirements for all types of helicopters. Notable programmes in recent years include orders of eight AH-64E Apache attack helicopters and more than 20 locally assembled Bell 412EP utility helicopters. As with the other services, however, a lack of investment in C4ISR capability thwarts any effort to develop a modern and integrated fighting force and, in this sense, it is notable that the TNI-AD remains a long way behind some of the 'future solider' advancements taking place in neighbouring Singapore.

Defence spending

The TNI's development will be supported by a defence budget that Widodo has promised to increase significantly. Speaking in June he pledged to increase defence spending as a proportion of national GDP from the existing 0.8% to 1.5% by the end of the decade.

The statement reflects a requirement to accelerate TNI modernisation, but to increase spending to this extent will be a significant challenge and will depend on Widodo's ability to reduce Indonesia's huge fuel subsidies, which in 2014 rose to a record USD30 billion, or nearly 3% of GDP.

Procurement trends

The largesse offered by Moscow has partly enabled Russia to assume a position as Indonesia's most important procurement partner. Indonesia has purchased a range of Russian military systems - including Sukhoi fighters, Mil helicopters and military vehicles - with many programmes supported by credit. If Indonesia's dependency on loans continues, Russia is likely to remain Indonesia's primary military supplier.

Jakarta has also made it clear, however, that it does not want to become overly dependent on Russia. As its defence budget has expanded Indonesia has procured military equipment from a range of countries including Brazil, China, France, Germany, South Korea, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Seoul has been the biggest beneficiary of Indonesia's diversification strategy, with contracts secured in recent years to supply Chang Bogo-class submarines, T-50 trainer aircraft, and Black Fox armoured vehicles. South Korea and Indonesia are also collaborating on the development of the Korean next-generation fighter aircraft, dubbed the KFX.

Industry

The requirement to ensure supply of materiel is also partly driving the development of the indigenous defence industry base. Industry modernisation is also considered key in Indonesia's efforts to transform its economy from low-end manufacturing and agriculture to advanced industry sectors that have an emphasis on productivity and innovation and provide skilled employment for the country's growing population. Existing capability is mainly centred on the state-owned companies that dominate Indonesia's defence industrial base. These include aerospace manufacturer PT Dirgantara, land systems specialist PT Pindad, shipbuilder PT PAL, and electronics company PT Len.

The industrial base has established competency in licenced production - notably of small- and medium-sized transport aircraft and helicopters - although the capability to indigenously develop and manufacture complete platforms and systems is generally limited to armoured personnel carriers and smaller naval platforms. Indonesia's defence sector is also capable in the production of small arms, ammunition, explosives and propellants, the development of some defence technologies, and the maintenance and repair of aircraft and naval vessels.

Outlook

The progression of Indonesia's industrial base will depend greatly on TNI modernisation and, although this is certain to continue over the coming decade, the rate of that development is uncertain. Will Widodo accelerate TNI modernisation in order to support an expanding security role in the Asia-Pacific region, or will he retain the TNI's largely internal focus and make only piecemeal steps towards the development of a modern military?

The defence White Paper will provide some clues as to Widodo's vision for the TNI, although it is likely that he will need to perform something of a balancing act. In future years the TNI will need to maintain capability to address internal threats while also enhancing capability to secure national sovereignty in the face of increasing Chinese expansionism and shifting power claims in the Asia-Pacific region.

Widodo will also need to keep strong Indonesia's economic links with China because to do all this requires a robust economy and significant defence investment. Freeing up funds to support accelerated TNI modernisation will be one major hurdle for Widodo. Another will be the political determination required to enable Indonesia to fulfil its promise as a major regional power